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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-1137 
_____________ 
 
MD MALL ASSOCIATES, LLC,  
t/a MacDade Mall Associates LP 
 
v. 
 
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. 
 
 
MD MALL ASSOCIATES, LLC, 
         Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2:11-cv-04068) 
District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: September 18, 2019) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION 
 
 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
  
2 
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 MD Mall Associates, LLC appeals the District Court’s judgment following a 
bench trial in favor of Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc., which dismissed MD Mall’s 
attempt to hold CSX liable for damage to its downhill property caused by storm water 
runoff. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I.1  
In his exceedingly thorough and well-reasoned opinion, Chief Judge Sanchez 
explained the Court’s conclusion that MD Mall had failed to sufficiently answer the most 
central question for a liability determination—whether the installation of the railroad and 
right-of-way owned by CSX altered or changed storm water flow patterns.2 MD Mall 
now argues that the District Court misapplied Pennsylvania storm water law, the doctrine 
of damnum absque injuria, trespass standards, and negligence standards. We disagree and 
need only summarize the District Court’s analysis. 
Trespass liability is established under Pennsylvania law based on a landowner’s 
control, collection, and shifting of surface water from one location to another, via an 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332. We now have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291.  We review a district court’s factual findings for 
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, 
Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2014). 
2MD Mall Assoc., LLC v. CSX Transp., Inc., 288 F. Supp. 3d 565, 588 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
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artificial channel.3 Pennsylvania common law recognizes the “right of flowage”4—the 
right of an upper-landowner to have the surface waters flowing on their land to be 
discharged through the “natural water course” onto the land of another.5  However, “an 
upper landowner is liable for the effects of surface water running off his property in two 
distinct circumstances: (1) where the landowner has diverted the water from its natural 
channel by artificial means; or (2) where the landowner has unreasonably or 
unnecessarily increased the quantity or changed the quality of water discharged upon his 
neighbor.”6 The railroad was constructed in the late 1800s, before the upgradient 
residential development was constructed, decades before the Mall was constructed, and a 
century before the flooding problem arose. As the District Court concluded:  
There is no evidence as to whether the high point on the north side of the 
right-of-way, which blocks water from the right-of-way from flowing down 
the Mall hill, existed when the track was constructed in the late–1800s, or 
that CSX created the high point. Nor is there any evidence that CSX or its 
predecessor did anything to change the natural grade of the land along the 
length of the right-of-way.7  
The court, thus, concluded that the Mall had not shown that CSX or its predecessor 
                                              
3 Rau v. Wilden Acres, Inc., 103 A. 2d 422, 424 (Pa. 1954). 
4 Pfeiffer v. Brown, 30 A. 844, 845 (Pa. 1895). Pennsylvania courts have addressed the 
right of flowage in the context of railroads by explaining that where the diversion of 
water onto adjacent land is “the necessary consequence of the construction and 
maintenance” of a railroad, a lower landowner can only recover with a showing of 
negligence in the construction or maintenance of the rail. Flaherty v. Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry. Co, 63 Pa. Super 622, 623 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1916). 
5 Shamnoski v. PG Energy, Div. of S. Union Co., 858 A.2d 589, 605 (Pa. 2004) (quoting 
Lucas v. Ford, 69 A.2d 114, 116 (Pa. 1949)).  
6 Bretz v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 86 A.3d 306, 316 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (continuing 
trespass); LaForm v. Bethlehem Township, 499 A.2d 1373, 1383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) 
(negligence). 
7 See MD Mall Assocs., LLC 288 F. Supp. 3d at 588. 
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artificially channeled water from the right of way onto the Mall property.8  Moreover, the 
District Court correctly held that MD Mall had not established that the railroad was 
constructed in a matter that diverts water from its natural channel.  
MD Mall incorrectly argues that the District Court misapplied the doctrine of 
damnum absque injuria. The doctrine provides an alternate liability shield for upper 
landowners.9 The District Court relied on long established Pennsylvania law to explain 
why the doctrine precluded MD Mall’s recovery.10 “Where the diversion of water onto 
the adjacent land is ‘the necessary consequence of the construction and maintenance of 
the road, a[n] [adjacent] landowner cannot recover in the absence of anything to show 
that the railroad company has been guilty of some unlawful act or of negligence in the 
construction and maintenance of its line.’”11  
Finally, as the District Court explained, MD Mall has not established that CSX 
was negligent and a landowner only has a duty to control surface area water where one of 
the two right of flowage exceptions is met.12  MD Mall failed to sufficiently establish that 
                                              
8 See MD Mall Assoc., 288 F. Supp. 3d at 590-91 (finding that the “Mall has not 
established that CSX has a duty” and setting out other evidentiary lacunae). Nor did the 
Mall contend that the District Court’s evidentiary findings on the negligence claim were 
clearly erroneous. 
9 Under this doctrine an upper landowner can avoid liability, even if s/he changed the 
property, if the damage to a lower landowner caused by storm water flow occurred based 
on a lawful, non-negligent use of property, and the damage was unavoidable. See e.g., 
Pfeiffer, 30 A. at 845; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 457 (Pa. 1886). 
10 See MD Mall Assoc., 288 F. Supp. 3d at 585. 
11 Id. at 586 (quoting Flaherty, 63 Pa.Super. at 623). 
12 LaForm, 499 A.2d at 1378. “[W]here the factors of artificial diversion or unreasonable 
or unnecessary increase are not present,” however, “a landowner is under no duty to tame 
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the water flow patterns in the late 1800s prior to installation of the railroad and right-of-
way.13  
II. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court. 14      
                                              
the surface waters flowing over his land.” Id. at 1383. See also MD Mall Assoc., 288 F. 
Supp. 3d at 585–86. 
13 See MD Mall Assoc., 288 F. Supp. 3d at 590-91 (finding that the “Mall has not 
established that CSX has a duty” and setting out other evidentiary lacunae).   Nor 
did the Mall contend that the District Court’s evidentiary findings on the 
negligence claim were clearly erroneous. 
14 CSX also argued that MD Mall’s claims were preempted by the Federal Railroad 
Safety Act and the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, and the District 
Court addressed that argument in its opinion. See MD Mall Assocs., 288 F.Supp.3d at 
591.  However, since we agree that CSX is not liable to MD Mall, we need not revisit the 
preemption discussion.  
